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Book Review

Interpreting Law and Literature: A
Hermeneutic Reader
Edited By Levinson & Mailloux

Doing What Comes Naturally: Change,
Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in
Literary and Legal Studies
By S. Fish
Reviewed by James D. Hopkinst

The affinity between law and literature has been marked
over the years. Both law and literature depend on the use of
language and linguistics techniques; both are close to the human
condition. Lawyers and judges are constantly concerned with the
need to reach the meaning of the Constitution and statutes, not
to speak of the intent of a testator or contracting parties. Words,
in short, are the common coin of lawyer and literary artist alike.
1 and the
The editors of Interpreting Law and Literature
2
author of Doing What Comes Naturally are representatives of
t Columbia College, 1931; Columbia Law School, 1933; Justice, Appellate Division
2d Dept., Supreme Court of New York, 1962-81.
1. INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIc READER (Levinson and Mailloux ed. 1988) [hereinafter INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE]. Sanford Levinson is the
Charles T. McCormick Professor of Law at the University of Texas; Steven Mailloux is
Professor of English at Syracuse University.
2. S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) [hereinafter DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY]. Stanley Fish is Arts and Sciences Professor of English, and Professor of Law at
Duke University.
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this alliance. Interpreting Law and Literature brings together
articles and essays written by lawyers and literary scholars; Doing What Comes Naturally is a compendium of essays by Stanley Fish published in law reviews and literary journals.
Though the material presented in both books is far ranging,
the focal point is narrow: How shall we read and understand
past writings? More specifically, are there tests available to the
reader whereby the intent of the writer can be precisely ascertained? Or does the language of the writing control? The lawyer
faces these questions frequently; the literary critic engages in
seemingly endless, and sometimes acrimonious debate over the
fine nuances of meaning. The ultimate question broached in
both books is whether interpretation in the two disciplines proceeds similarly. If that is so, can the learning amassed in one be
applied advantageously by the other?
The books deal with hermeneutics, a term which The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary traces to the
eighteenth century.' The dictionary defines the term as the art
and science of interpretation, apparently derived from Hermes,
the Greek god of science, commerce, eloquence and many of the
arts of life, who was in his tutelary character the god of speech,
writing and traffic.' It is somewhat daunting to discover that another derivative from Hermes - hermetic - is described in
the dictionary as the practice of occult sciences, surely a contradiction in meaning and a rather sinister reflection on the office
of hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics "goes back to ancient attempts to construct
general rules for understanding religious texts such as the Bible." 5 As we know, these attempts led to sharp differences, culminating in persecution and war.6 According to Hirsch, "hermeneutical theorizing was confined almost exclusively to two
domains where correct interpretation was a matter of life and
death (or Heaven and Hell) the study of scripture and the

3. THE COMPACT
4. Id.
5. INTERPRETING

EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

1295 (1971).

supra note 1, at ix. See also HARPER DIC280-81 (1977).
6. For example, interpretative differences led to the excommunication of Martin Luther by the Catholic Church and fueled religious conflicts. See, e.g., L. CRISTIANI, THE
REVOLT AGAINST THE CHURCH 72 (1962).
LAW AND LITERATURE,

TIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/10

2

1990]

BOOK REVIEW: HERMENEUTICS

study of law."' 7 At first, the resemblance of law to religious conviction in Hirsch's reference to mortal concern seems strained,
until one recalls the bloodshed and violence arising after the
Dred Scott decision.'
Lately, a fervor approaching that accompanying scriptural
disputes has brought about the expression of rhetoric in the discussion of constitutional interpretation. The proposal of nearly
literal interpretation as opposed to the concept of expansive interpretation is more than a philosophical difference; its resolution affects the direction of our law and culture.
The controversy over scriptural interpretation centered on
whether the text itself should be narrowly construed, or whether
the text should be read broadly, sometimes as metaphor or
sometimes in conjunction with the current setting. The textualists (or originalists) rest on the sense of the language; the contextualists rest on inference suggested by structure and relationship of the words of the text and on the cultural changes in
place at the time of the interpretation.'
Literary critics have created theories of interpretation based
on this fundamental schism, but with greater analytic development. One of the dominant theories, linked to Jacques Derrida,10
is known as "deconstruction." Deconstruction, according to Derrida, means undoing, not destroying in the process of analyzing
the layers of a structure.1" Deconstruction, thus, questions not
only the text, but what the text leaves out, or in the terms of the
theory, what has been repressed. 2
Such an abstruse doctrine appears not only vague in application, but also alien to the interpretation of legal text. Never-

7. E.D. HIRSCH, JR., THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION 19-20 (1972). The author is the
William R. Kenan Professor of English at the University of Virginia.
8. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See also J.S. DYE, HISTORY'
OF THE PLOTS AND CRIMES OF THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TO OVERTHROW LIBERTY IN AMERICA

(1866) (detailing the events in the bloody battlefields of the American Civil War from
1861 to 1865).
9. This distinction between textualists and contextualists, along with other modified
versions of both approaches, is drawn by Brest, The Mission and Quest for the Original
Understanding, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 70-71, 80-84.
Paul Brest is Dean of the Stanford Law School.
10. INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at x.
11. Id.
12. INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at xi.
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theless, deconstruction is considered by Clare Dalton13 to be relevant to contractual relationships. She notes that stressing the
words of a contract over the subjective intent of the actors overlooks the problem of knowledge, which is consequently a repressed element.1 ' Jessica Lane uses deconstructionist tenets in
her critique of Ronald Dworkin's model of legal interpretation.' 5
Whether deconstructionism or any other theory of literary
interpretation may be aptly applied to the law is subject to gentle skepticism; it is a question contingent on present practice of
constitutional and statutory interpretation, together with the
appraisal of the particular circumstances calling for the application of the constitutional or statutory provision. In certain cases,
what the writing leaves out may be critical to the analysis. This
is not deconstructionist dogma.
The intent of the authors is repeatedly held to be the source
of the interpretation of the Constitution and statutes."6 Legislative history is routinely examined in reaching intent.1 7 But there
are some who would grant little significance to legislative debate,
which they believe to be inconclusive and not binding on the
silent legislators; their key to intent is the language which was
finally adopted.' 8 One thinks of the journal kept by James
Madison during the drafting of the Constitution'" and the inval13. Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, in

INTERPRETING

LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 285. Dalton is Assistant Professor of Law at

Harvard Law School.
14. Id. at 290 n.20.
15. Lane, The Poetics of Legal Interpretation,in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 269. Lane is a doctoral candidate in English at Johns Hopkins
University.
16. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (interpreting the fifth
amendment bar to double jeopardy); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)
(discussing the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1954) (discussing status
of public education at the time of enactment of the fourteenth amendment); Maine v.
Thiboutet, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (discussing legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C § 1988 (1982)); Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 635-37 (1980) (scope of a municipality's immunity from liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is essentially one of statutory construction).
18. But see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (discussing the historical
context surrounding the enactment of the fourteenth amendment).
19. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Ohio University Press ed. 1984) (first published in v. 2-3 of The Papers of James Madison, Washington, 1840).
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uable aid which his notes bear to the meaning of the language.
That view becomes somewhat dimmed when one reads that
Madison thought that "the debates and incidental decisions of
20
the Convention can have no authoritative character.
The split reflected by these outlooks has progressed to serious proportions in recent years, especially in the consideration
of the Constitution. The senatorial hearing held on the appointment of Judge Bork is the most striking illustration. Bork was
questioned closely concerning his beliefs, shown both by his judicial opinions, and by his philosophy as displayed in his law
review articles. 1
How should we interpret our Constitution? As might be expected, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and former Attorney
General Edwin Meese III have different standards. Justice Brennan looks at the constitutional language "with full consciousness
that it [is] . . . the community's interpretation that is sought."22
Thus, he would engraft on the language the historical and cultural background formed between the framing of the Constitution until the day of decision in a particular case. Meese, on the
other hand, argues that the interpretation depends on the meaning which the authors had in mind in choosing the language,23 a
view, which though rooted in the text, is not as absolutely literalist as that held by commentator Max Radin, who contended
that even intention should not enter into interpretation, but
only the naked text.2 4
The problems are better defined through example. The
Constitution provides that no person shall be eligible for the office of President who shall not have attained the age of thirty-

20. Powell, James Madison's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, in INTERsupra note 1, at 97-98. H. Jefferson Powell is Associate
Professor of Law at the University of Iowa.
21. Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the U.S.: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1011 (1987).
22. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 13, 15. William J. Brennan, Jr. is an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
23. Meese, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 25, 28. Edwin Meese III is
the former Attorney General of the United States.
24. M. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 869-70 (1930).
PRETING LAW AND LITERATURE,
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five years.2" There is little to interpret in this language; the
words are blunt. The same section also provides that no person,
except a natural born citizen or a citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, is eligible to be President.26 This language excludes a naturalized citizen, but it is debatable whether
it excludes a person born of citizens on foreign soil.
Fish refers to the problem of a general statute, such as one
defining larceny as the taking of "the property of another without his consent . *...
,27 A rule of that general character raises
questions whether the act complained of is a "taking," or
whether embezzlement and fraud could be considered larceny. 8
Thus, the general rule necessitates the making of subordinate
rules to further the process of interpretation. It is noteworthy
that civil law attempted to meet the problem of interpreting a
general law by declaring that the judge should decide the case,
unprovided for by the statute, by a rule which he would lay
down if he were a legislator.2 9 The duty thus cast on the judge,
though difficult to discharge, seems no more onerous than the
making of a common law rule.
In Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,0 Professor Tushnet points out
that Griswold v. Connecticut,"' the case finding a constitutional
interest of privacy, relied on precedents which were ambiguous
in justifying that reliance. 2 Tushnet further points out that the
reliance can be justified by a reasonable reading of the precedents cited as exemplars of the concept of privacy beyond the

25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
26. Id.
27. S. FIsH, Fish v. Fiss, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 2, at 120-21.
28. Id. at 121.
29. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codificationand Legal Method for State
and Nation, 17 TUL. L. REV. 351, 375 (1943).
30. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 193. Mark V.
Tushnet is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
31. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 208-09 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), which held unconstitutional a requirement that children attend public rather than private schools and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which held that a state could not prohibit the teaching of
foreign languages to young children).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/10

6

1990]

BOOK REVIEW: HERMENEUTICS

outlines of the factual patterns in each case. It is, of course, to
be observed that his explanation embraces items of potential
dispute over or about which reasonable minds might differ.
It appears plain, therefore, that interpretation of writings in
the law is a delicate process, to which the judge must summon
up and analyze a congerie of elements such as intention, setting,
present day concerns and practical consequences, in order to
strike a final balance. That balancing act was acutely, if metaphorically, described by Learned Hand: "[T]he meaning of a
sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can
ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appears, and
which all collectively create." 3
Can this process be lightened by resort to the methods of
literary critics? It is somewhat revealing that the word "critic"
comes from the Greek "kritikos" and "kritos," meaning judge.
Both the literary critic and the judge are engaged in the interpretation of language to explain and to persuade. There are
other parallels between them, but there are distinctions as well.
The great distinction is that the judge performs institutional
functions - determining disputes and issuing rules for future
conduct. The critic has no public function and, thereby, acts
under no rule save his own. Even so, the interpretation of language is an occupation common to both.
E.D. Hirsch, a professor of English at the University of Virginia, argues that the problem of interpretation should be put in
focus by the question asked by Lewis Carroll through Humpty34
Dumpty: Who shall be master - the writer or the reader?
This question assumes that the reader is at liberty to add, detract and modify the intent of the writer. Certain novels, rich in
symbolic material, are fertile grounds for the critic's imagination - Herman Melville's Moby Dick, James Joyce's Ulysses,
Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus, to list a few. The critic, in extending the scope or metaphors of the novel or poem, does no
injury, except incidentally affording the opportunity for fierce

33. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934); see also Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
34. Hirsch, Counterfactuals in Interpreting,in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE,
supra note 1, at 55, 56.
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and often rancorous controversy among his fellow critics, and
sometimes between the author and himself.
Hirsch distinguishes between meaning and significance.
Meaning, he says, is what the writer had in mind; significance is
what the reader makes of that meaning, giving consideration to
the sense of the writer at the time of his creation. 5 He discerns
these steps in the process of interpretation: (1) to understand
the original meaning; (2) to accommodate it to present circumstances; and (3) to distinguish between an accommodation true
to the spirit of the original and one that is not.3 6 He recognizes,
however, a license in the creator; for example, a poet may repudiate or alter a poem, just as the legislature may repeal or
amend a law.3 7 Fish is skeptical of the critic who follows selfimposed tests because it is not possible for the critic to insulate
himself from the effect of deeply held norms shared by the critic
and the society of which he is a part.3 8
Charles Fried, recently Solicitor General, takes as a text for
interpretation Shakespeare's Sonnet LXV. To Fried, the transparent meaning of the poem is the impermanence of the most
substantial things - of rocks and steel gates - but the true
meaning to him is that black ink, the medium of language, survives the passing of time.3 9 Yet, Philip Martin, an English
scholar, reviewing the same poem, finds that it ends not in certainty, but is "deliberately and properly tentative," for it contemplates that only a miracle can succeed in preserving beauty.4 0
These differences in critical insight immediately throw into
question the governance of interpretation by the imposition of
rules. Fish points out that the true rule'generates the correct
result, independently of the critic, and that the true rule is ex-

35. Id. at 57.
36. Id. at 61.
37. Id. at 67-68. Hirsch cites as an analogy the change wrought to the holding of
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. S. FISH, Critical Self-Consciousness, Or Can We Know What We're Doing, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 2, at 436, 440-41.
39. Fried, Sonnet LXV and the Black Ink of the Framers' Intentions, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 45, 48-49. Charles Fried was the Solicitor
General of the United States.
40. Martin, On Sonnet LXV, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1,
at 53. Philip Martin is Senior Lecturer in English at Monash University, Melbourne.
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emplified by mathematics, not susceptible to varying answers."'
Thus, social theory and the literary standards observed by critics, under the true rule, can never be formalized definitively to
interpret and construe literary text in the same way, no matter
the time or the circumstances.
A cluster of axioms, called canons, has grown around the
process of interpretation in the law. The canons are considered
as aids to arrive at the true construction of the writing. But, as
Karl Llewellyn 42 demonstrated, the canons are often at crosspurposes, and the judge may easily find a canon to justify his
interpretation.4 One canon proclaims that a penal statute
should be construed liberally to carry out its purpose, while another canon asserts that a penal statute should be construed
narrowly in order to protect life and liberty. In essence, the canons cancel one another, and their use is reduced to a justification for a result, rather than a rule requiring a result.
In Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co.,44 the Court of Appeals of
New York was divided four-to-two over whether the word "family" should be construed to include a deceased tenant's roommate with whom he had lived for over ten years. 45 Both the ma'46
jority and minority cited dictionary definitions of "family.
Both sides invoked the intent of the authors and the purpose of
the regulation.4 7 Yet, opposing conclusions were reached by the
judges.48
Ronald Dworkin contends that there is almost always one

41. S.FISH, Consequences, in DOING

WHAT COMES NATURALLY,

supra note 2, at 315,

317.
42. Karl Llewellyn is the noted author of numerous books and law review articles,
and chief reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code.
43. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). A broad
canvass of the canons is contained in N.Y. STATUTES LAW ch. 6 (McKinney 1971 and
Supp. 1990); see also SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION chs. 55, 61 (4th ed. 1986).
44. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
45. Id. The regulation in question provided that the landlord on the death of the
tenant may not dispossess either the surviving spouse of the tenant or a member of the
deceased tenant's family living with the tenant. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 785.
46. Id. at 211, 219, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 59, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789, 794.
47. Id. at 211, 218, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 58, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789, 793.
48. Id. at 214, 223, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790, 796.
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right answer to any legal question. 49 However, he assumes the
presence of one omniscient judge which eliminates the annoyance of competing opinions. Ideally, there may be one true interpretation; pragmatically, it is inevitable that differing interpretations will emerge due to ambiguous wording that must be
applied to new factual backgrounds.
In the end, interpretation of legal writings is an art, not a
science. 5° The result stems from a melange of many elements:
the words themselves; the setting of the case; the consequences
of the surrounding legal framework on the system; and, of
course, the judge's own cultural influences and beliefs.5 1 Both
InterpretingLaw and Literature and Doing What Comes Naturally offer rich material to develop a philosophical and comprehensive explanation of what occurs in the interpretative process,
which may be more satisfying than the amorphous answers currently seen.
While there are many similarities between law and literature, there are many differences as well. It is doubtful that the
theories of literary criticism can be imported wholesale into the
world of legal construction. Judges and lawyers do not enjoy the
absolute freedom of speculation; they are bound by ties of precedent, of legislative action and the need for consistency, for better or worse. It is at once the impediment and the glory of the
common law that judges are forced to adhere to the regimen of
the system which maintains rules which cannot be violated without peril.
All decision-making is to a degree intuitive; the decisionmaker must always be aware of the intuitive sense and put it in
its proper place, always in the perspective of the surrounding
legal relations. For the luxury of philosophical argumentation, I
commend to you the varying visions portrayed in these two
books. Though much of the disputations rest on arcane and
sometimes knife-like reasoning, as lawyers we should not avoid

49. Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 58 (1977).
50. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527 (1947).
51. See, e.g., Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933), in which Justice Cardozo
asked, in considering variant statutory meanings, "which choice is it the more likely that
Congress would have made?" Id. at 285. Justice Cardozo said that it was a choice between uncertainties, and that "[wie must be content to choose the lesser." Id. at 288.
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the delight of observing finely spun pleading. Even more to the
point, we should be aware of the developments in abutting fields
of learning. The experience of the past is that the body of the
law is confronted by the cultural controversy. Most probably,
there is a lag in the challenge. But be ready, my friends, be
ready.
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